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I. Introduction 
In recent years, images of United States police wearing 
helmets and masks, carrying military-style weapons, and riding in 
armored or even mine-resistant armored vehicles have become 
increasingly prevalent with media depictions of responses to civil 
disorder and a purported nationwide trend of police 
militarization.1 At the same time, the Department of Defense 
(DOD) and the White House have released some of the federal 
government’s most significant policy guidance ever prescribing 
and proscribing defense support to civilian authorities, reflecting 
over two centuries of past military engagement with civil 
authorities, responses to present emergencies and disasters, and 
future anticipated political, fiscal, and security realities.2 
Specifically, DOD Instruction 3025.21 “Defense Support of Civilian 
Law Enforcement Agencies,” was issued on February 27, 2013, 
supplementing DOD Directive (DODD) Number 3025.18, Defense 
Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA).3 It replaced several older 
DOD issuances4 on military assistance to civilian law enforcement 
                                                                                                     
 1. See Police Militarization, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/criminal-
law-reform/reforming-police-practices/police-militarization (describing the 
nationwide trend of police militarization) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 2. Portions of the following have been adapted from U.S. MILITARY 
OPERATIONS: LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 797–829 (Geoffrey S. Corn et al. eds., 
2015). 
 3. See DEP’T OF DEF. INSTR. 3025.21, DEF. SUPPORT OF CIVILIAN L. ENF’T 
AGENCIES (Feb. 27, 2013), https://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf 
/302521p.pdf (establishing DOD policy and replacing DoDDs 3025.12, 5525.5, and 
5030.46), published in 78 Fed. Reg. 71 (Apr. 12, 2013) (to be codified at 32 CFR 
§ 182), http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2013/04/dsclea.pdf. It is important to note 
that Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3025.18 is also still in effect. See 
DEP’T OF DEF. DIRECTIVE 3025.18, DEF. SUPPORT OF CIV. AUTH. (DSCA) (Dec. 29, 
2010), http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/ pdf/302518p.pdf (incorporating 
and canceling DOD Directive 3025.1 and 3025.15 (references a and b)). 
 4. See, e.g., What are the DoD Issuances, WASH. HEADQUARTERS SERV’S., 
http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/blaw/dodd/general.html (“A [DOD Instruction] is a DoD 
issuance that implements the policy, or prescribes the manner or a specific plan 
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and civil disturbances, and affects the way in which Active and 
Reserve Component forces implement nearly fifty-year-old civil 
disturbance contingency plans in the Twenty-First Century. 
Months after the disastrous effects of the October 2012 Superstorm 
Sandy,5 and weeks prior to the devastating April 15, 2013 Boston 
Marathon bombings,6 the May 20, 2013 El Reno tornado in 
Oklahoma,7 and the summer 2013 wildfires in both Arizona8 and 
Colorado,9 the DOD issued an instruction clarifying the rules for 
the involvement of military forces in civilian law enforcement. The 
instruction establishes DOD policy, assigns responsibilities, and 
provides procedures for DOD support to Federal, State, tribal, and 
local civilian law enforcement agencies, including responses to civil 
disturbances within the United States. 
The defense support instruction requires that senior DOD 
officials develop “procedures and issue appropriate direction as 
necessary for defense support of civilian law enforcement agencies 
in coordination with the General Counsel of the Department of 
                                                                                                     
of action for carrying out the policy. . . . A Regulation is a document of general 
application designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe procedural 
requirements”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and 
Social Justice). 
 5. See, e.g., Superstorm Sandy: Before, During and Beyond, NAT’L PUB. 
RADIO, http://www.npr.org/series/164212970/full-coverage-superstorm-sandy 
(providing news coverage on Superstorm Sandy) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 6. See, e.g., Boston Marathon Terror Attack Fast Facts, CNN (Apr. 8, 2016, 
7:18 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/03/us/boston-marathon-terror-attack-
fast-facts (reporting on the Boston Marathon bombings) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 7. See, e.g., Kendis Gibson, Oklahoma Tornado 2013: Death toll rises to 18, 
WJLA (June 3, 2013), http://www.wjla.com/articles/2013/06/oklahoma-tornado-
2013-death-toll-rises-to-12-89611.html (reporting on the death toll from the 
Oklahoma Tornado) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights 
and Social Justice). 
 8. See, e.g., Report: Arizona Wildfire Grew Quickly, Was Erratic, CBS 5 / 
KHPO (Jul. 15, 2013, 10:28 PM), http://www.cbs5az.com/story/22848108/report-
arizona-wildfire-grew-quickly-was-erratic?autostart=true (reporting on the 
Arizona wildfires in 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil 
Rights and Social Justice). 
 9. See, e.g., Saddie Gurman, Ryan Parker & Joey Brunch, Colorado 
Wildfires Consume Homes, Force Evacuations, DENV. POST, (June 11, 2013, 3:29 
PM), http://www.denverpost.com/2013/06/11/colorado-fires-consume-homes-force-
evacuations (reporting on the Colorado wildfires in 2013) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
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Defense, and in consultation with the Attorney General of the 
United States,” including “tasking the DOD Components to plan 
for and to commit DOD resources in response to requests from civil 
authorities for [civil disturbance operations].”10 Military officials 
are to coordinate with “civilian law enforcement agencies on 
policies to further DOD cooperation with civilian law enforcement 
agencies” and the heads of the combatant commands are 
instructed to issue procedures for “establishing local contact points 
in subordinate commands for purposes of coordination with 
Federal, State, tribal, and local civilian law enforcement 
officials.”11 This is especially important in the realm of so-called 
complex catastrophes that would overwhelm local and state 
agencies individually and require federal agency involvement with 
the DOD supporting an overall effort.12  
Also in February 2013, Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton 
Carter issued a memorandum to define complex catastrophe as: 
Any natural or man-made incident, including cyberspace 
attack, power grid failure, and terrorism, which results in 
cascading failures of multiple, interdependent, critical, life-
sustaining infrastructure sectors and causes extraordinary 
levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely 
affecting the population, environment, economy, public health, 
national morale, response efforts, and/or government 
functions.13 
                                                                                                     
 10. See DEP’T OF DEF. INSTR. 3025.21, supra note 3, at 10 (describing the 
responsibilities for the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and 
Americas’ Security Affairs).  
 11. See id. at 12 (describing the responsibilities for the Heads of the DOD 
Components). 
 12. See Christopher DeHart, Army North Hosts Northern Command 
Complex Catastrophe Session, U.S. N. COMMAND (June 6, 2013), 
http://www.northcom.mil/Newsroom/Article/563636/army-north-hosts-northern-
command-complex-catastrophe-session (quoting Major Chris Byrd, civil support 
planner with the Army North Operations Section, “Cooperation and coordination 
become vital components to successfully dealing with a complex catastrophe 
situation”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social 
Justice). 
 13. See Memorandum from Deputy Sec’y of Def., Dep’t of Def., to Sec’ys of 
the Military Dep’ts et al. (Feb. 19, 2013), https://wss.apan.org/2530/ 
Staff%20Sections/DSCA/Complex%20Catastrophe%20Definition.pdf (establishing 
the DOD definition of “complex catastrophe.”). 
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This was especially significant to enable the DOD to “assess a 
broader range of forces, defense installations assets, and other 
DOD capabilities that could aid in response to complex 
catastrophes,”14 as well as align DOD efforts with the 2011 
Presidential Policy Directive 8, “National Preparedness,”15 and 
other key sources of policy and strategic guidance, and prioritize 
strategy, policy and planning, and preparedness. 
At nearly the same time, DOD issued its Strategy for 
Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities to 
address the range of “current and emerging threats to the 
homeland and natural and manmade hazards inside the United 
States for the period 2012-2020 [ . . . ] in keeping with current 
fiscal realities.”16 
                                                                                                     
 14. See id. (explaining the significance of the DOD definition of “complex 
catastrophe.”). 
 15. See Presidential Policy Directive 8: National Preparedness, HOMELAND 
SEC. (Mar. 30, 2011), https://www.dhs.gov/presidential-policy-directive-8-
national-preparedness (“Presidential Policy Directive / PPD-8 is aimed at 
strengthening the security and resilience of the United States through systematic 
preparation for the threats that pose the greatest risk to the security of the nation, 
including acts of terrorism, cyberattacks, pandemics, and catastrophic natural 
disasters”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social 
Justice). In this PPD, the President: 
[D]irect[ed] the development of a national preparedness goal that 
identifies the core capabilities necessary for preparedness and a 
national preparedness system to guide activities that will enable the 
Nation to achieve the goal. The system will allow the Nation to track 
the progress of our ability to build and improve the capabilities 
necessary to prevent, protect against, mitigate the effects of, respond 
to, and recover from those threats that pose the greatest risk to the 
security of the Nation. 
The Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and 
Counterterrorism shall coordinate the interagency development of an 
implementation plan for completing the national preparedness goal 
and national preparedness system. The implementation plan shall be 
submitted to me within 60 days from the date of this directive, and 
shall assign departmental responsibilities and delivery timelines for 
the development of the national planning frameworks and associated 
interagency operational plans described below. 
Id. 
 16. See Leon E. Panetta, Forward to U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., STRATEGY FOR 
HOMELAND DEF. & DEF. SUPPORT OF CIV. AUTH.’S (Feb. 2013), 
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=732192 (elaborating on the priorities for the core 
DOD missions) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and 
Social Justice). 
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Part II of this chapter overviews the historic laws and policies 
that are the foundations for defense support to civilian authorities, 
particularly in the context of support to law enforcement agencies 
and the prevention of or response to civil disorders. This sets the 
stage for a non-exhaustive historical assessment in Part III of 20th 
and 21st century examples of defense support to civil authorities, 
broken down into the eras of: the early to mid-20th Century; mid 
to late-20th Century; the late 1970s through early 1990s: and the 
so-called “Garden Plot” civil disturbance plan being revisited in 
real-world application; and the early 2000s through 2010s, putting 
the Federal Government’s National Response Plan (NRP) (later 
called National Response Framework–NRF) to test in 
contemporary operations under policies extant at the time of this 
chapter’s writing and under the limitations of the 2015 Executive 
Order directing better coordinated Federal support for state, local 
and tribal law enforcement equipment acquisition. This will set the 
stage for the way ahead described in Part IV, considering the 
current framework for future national response to disasters and 
emergencies.  
II. Historic Laws as the Foundations for Defense Support 
Defense support of civil authorities policy changes must be 
read in light of an evolution, rather than revolution, involving over 
a century of federal troop deployments and 200-plus years of legal 
precedent, starting with the United States Constitution. Article I, 
Section 8 is the wellspring from which military to support civil 
authorities draws sustenance. Specifically, “Congress shall have 
power . . . to provide for calling forth the Militia to execute laws of 
the Union, suppress Insurrections, and repel Invasions.”17 In 
conjunction with this Congressional authority, each President 
“shall take care that the Laws be faithfully executed” consistent 
with Article II, Section 3.18 Read in conjunction with those 
provisions, the basis for Federal government support, including 
DOD assistance, to State and local authorities arises under the 
Tenth Amendment, inasmuch as “The powers not delegated to the 
                                                                                                     
 17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 18. Id. at art. I, § 3. 
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United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it, are 
reserved to the States respectively.”19 
President George Washington found need to issue a 
proclamation in 1794 summoning 13,000 federalized militia 
troops, led by Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton and 
Virginia governor Henry Lee, to march into western Pennsylvania 
to act against the Whiskey Rebellion over excise taxes in 
Pennsylvania. Subsequent legislation empowered the president to 
use regular military forces as well, and laws passed during the 
Civil War and Reconstruction periods further strengthened the 
executive’s use of federal troops, as well as setting forth limitations 
on its use.20  
The Insurrection Act of 1807 was one of the first and most 
important United States laws still in force on this subject, and was 
followed some 71 years later by the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, 
which continues to limit executive authority to conduct military 
law enforcement on United States soil. Each of those and other 
civil support laws has evolved over time—consistent with the times 
and the popular will expressed through Congress. 
The Insurrection Act, (codified, as amended, at 10 USC § 331–
335) has changed from its 1807 inception many times, with most 
notable alterations in the mid-twentieth century. This succinct law 
has consistently exempted federal (and federalized troops) from 
legal prohibitions on employment and deployment on US soil in the 
following instances: 
                                                                                                     
 19. Id. at amend. X § 3.  
 20. Presidential emergency power was established in six statutes in 1792, 
1795, 1807, 1871, and 1878: Calling Forth Act of 1792, ch. 28, 1 Stat. 264 (repealed 
1795); the Militia Act of 1795, ch. 36, 1 Stat. 424 (repealed in part 1861 and 
current version at 10 U.S.C. §§ 331–35 (2013)); the Insurrection Act of 1807, ch. 
39, 2 Stat. 443 (current version at 10 U.S.C. §§ 331–35 (2013)); the Suppression 
of the Rebellion Act of 1861, ch. 25, 12 Stat. 281 (current version at 10 U.S.C. 
§§ 331–35 (2013)); specific parts of the Ku Klux Klan (Civil Rights) Act of 1871, 
ch. 22, §§ 3–4, 17 Stat. 13, 14–15 (expired in part 1873 and current version at 10 
U.S.C. § 333), and; the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 (current version at 18 USC 
§ 1385 (2013). See, e.g., Stephen I. Vladeck, Note, Emergency Power and the 
Militia Acts, 114 YALE L.J. 149 (2004) (discussing the first five statutes). See also 
PAUL J. SCHEIPS, THE ROLE OF FEDERAL MILITARY FORCES IN DOMESTIC DISORDERS, 
1945-1992, 449–52 (2005), http://www.history.army. mil/html/books/030/30-
20/cmh_pub_30-20.pdf. Troop presence in the South for supposedly partisan 
political ends led to the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, “restoring an earlier 
national consensus that military intervention in civil affairs should occur only 
when specifically authorized in the law.” Id. 
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§ 331. Federal aid for State governments 
Whenever there is an insurrection (sic) in any State against its 
government, the President may, upon the request of its 
legislature or of its governor if the legislature cannot be 
convened, call into Federal service such of the militia of the 
other States, in the number requested by that State, and use 
such of the armed forces, as he considers necessary to suppress 
the insurrection.  
§ 332. Use of militia and armed forces to enforce Federal 
authority 
Whenever the President considers that unlawful obstructions, 
combinations, or assemblages, or rebellion against the 
authority of the United States, make it impracticable to enforce 
the laws of the United States in any State or Territory by the 
ordinary course of judicial proceedings, he may call into Federal 
service such of the militia of any State, and use such of the 
armed forces, as he considers necessary to enforce those laws or 
to suppress the rebellion.  
§ 333. Interference with State and Federal law 
The President, by using the militia or the armed forces, or both, 
or by any other means, shall take such measures as he considers 
necessary to suppress, in a State, any insurrection, domestic 
violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy, if it— 
(1) so hinders the execution of the laws of that State, and of the 
United States within the State, that any part or class of its 
people is deprived of a right, privilege, immunity, or protection 
named in the Constitution and secured by law, and the 
constituted authorities of that State are unable, fail, or refuse 
to protect that right, privilege, or immunity, or to give that 
protection; or  
(2) opposes or obstructs the execution of the laws of the United 
States or impedes the course of justice under those laws.  
In any situation covered by clause (1), the State shall be 
considered to have denied the equal protection of the laws 
secured by the Constitution.  
§ 334. Proclamation to disperse  
Whenever the President considers it necessary to use the 
militia or the armed forces under this chapter, he shall, by 
proclamation, immediately order the insurgents to disperse and 
retire peaceably to their abodes within a limited time.  
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§ 335. Guam and Virgin Islands included as “State”  
For purposes of this chapter, the term “State” includes the 
unincorporated territories of Guam and the Virgin Islands.21 
For a brief year, the Insurrection Act was expanded under the 
2007 John M. Warner Defense Authorization Act, then brought 
back to longstanding language in the subsequent fiscal year.22 In 
                                                                                                     
 21. 10 U.S.C. §§ 331–335 (2012); see also John R. Brinkerhoff, The Role of 
Federal Military Forces in Domestic Law Enforcement, JOINT CTR. FOR 
OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS J. (2004), http://www.narlo.org/posse%20comitatus.pdf 
(analyzing the Insurrection Act for the President’s authority to authorize federal 
troops to enforce the law). Brinkerhoff explained:  
Title 10, Section 331 was enacted in 1792 in response to challenges to 
the taxing power of the federal government. It allows the President, at 
the request of a governor or state legislature, to put down an 
insurrection by calling into federal service sufficient militia to 
“suppress the insurrection.”  
Title 10, Section 332 was enacted in 1861 at the outset of the Civil War. 
It allows the President to use the armed forces to enforce the laws or 
suppress a rebellion whenever, in his opinion, unlawful obstructions, 
combinations, or assemblages or rebellion against the authority of the 
United States make it impractical to enforce the laws using the course 
of judicial proceedings.  
Title 10, Section 333 was enacted in 1869 during the Reconstruction 
Era. It allows the President to use the armed forces or militia to 
respond to insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination, or 
conspiracies that prevent a state government from enforcing the laws.  
Title 10, Section 334 was enacted in 1861. It prescribes that the 
President shall issue a proclamation calling on insurgents to disperse 
before using the militia or armed forces to enforce the law. 
Id. 
 22. On September 30, 2006, the Congress modified the Insurrection Act as 
part of the 2007 Defense Authorization Bill (repealed as of 2008). The so-called 
“Insurrection Act Rider,” Section 1076 of the law, changed Section 333 of the 
Insurrection Act, and widened the President’s ability to deploy troops within the 
United States to enforce the laws. Under this act, the President could also deploy 
troops as a police force during a natural disaster, epidemic, serious public health 
emergency, terrorist attack, or other condition, when the President determines 
that the authorities of the state are incapable of maintaining public order. The 
bill also modified Section 334 of the Insurrection Act, giving the President 
authority to order the dispersal of either insurgents or “those obstructing the 
enforcement of the laws.” The law changed the name of the chapter from 
“Insurrection” to “Enforcement of the Laws to Restore Public Order.” The 2008 
Defense Authorization Bill, repealed the changes made in the 2007 bill. See, e.g., 
Kevin H. Govern, “Making Martial Law Easier” in the U.S, 1 HOMELAND SEC. REV. 
221, 221–30 (2007) (finding that the re-examination of domestic employment and 
deployment of military forces did not make marital law easier). 
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2011, President Obama signed the National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2012 into law, in which Section 1031, clause “b,” 
article 2 defines a “covered person,” i.e., someone possibly subject 
to detention, as the following:  
A person who was a part of or substantially supported al-Qaeda, 
the Taliban, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities 
against the United States or its coalition partners, including 
any person who has committed a belligerent act or has directly 
supported such hostilities in aid of such enemy forces.23 
The so-called Posse Comitatus Act (codified, as amended, at 18 
U.S.C. § 1385) uses a Latin term found in sixteenth-century 
English law meaning “to have the right to an armed retinue.”24 The 
Posse Comitatus Act passed on June 18, 1878, prohibiting federal 
troops from supervising Confederate state elections in the latter 
portion of the Reconstruction Era.25 It originally applied only to the 
US Army, but was amended after the US Air Force was created to 
include those forces in 1956, then has applied by DOD regulation 
to include US Navy and US Marine Corps forces as well. The Posse 
Comitatus Act reads now, as follows: 
Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly 
authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses 
any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or 
otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned not more than two years, or both.26 
Further, 6 U.S.C. § 466 is an unusual codification of a “sense of 
Congress reaffirming the continued importance and applicability 
of the Posse Comitatus Act,” in particular the following sub-
sections providing for exceptions and exemptions: 
(4) Nevertheless, by its express terms, the Posse Comitatus Act 
is not a complete barrier to the use of the Armed Forces for a 
                                                                                                     
 23. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 
112-81, § 1031 (b)(2), 125 Stat. 1298, 1562 (2011). 
 24. Charles Holloway, Posse Comitatus, CHARLES HOLLOWAY (July 4, 2012), 
http://www.charlesholloway.co.uk/2012/07/posse-comitatus/ (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 25. Kevin Govern, Lawful Military Support To Civil Authorities In Times of 
Crisis, JURIST, (May 2, 2013, 12:30 PM), http://jurist.org/forum/2013/05/kevin-
govern-posse-comitatus.php (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil 
Rights and Social Justice). 
 26. 18 U.S.C § 1385 (2012). 
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range of domestic purposes, including law enforcement 
functions, when the use of the Armed Forces is authorized by 
Act of Congress or the President determines that the use of the 
Armed Forces is required to fulfill the President’s obligations 
under the Constitution to respond promptly in time of war, 
insurrection, or other serious emergency.  
(5) Existing laws, including chapter 15 of Title 10 (commonly 
known as the “Insurrection Act”), and the Robert T. Stafford 
Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5121 
et seq.), grant the President broad powers that may be invoked 
in the event of domestic emergencies, including an attack 
against the Nation using weapons of mass destruction, and 
these laws specifically authorize the President to use the Armed 
Forces to help restore public order.27 
The Posse Comitatus Act has prohibited troops under federal 
authority (that is Title 10 Active Component troops and 
"federalized" Title 32 National Guard troops) from generally 
conducting law enforcement duties on United States soil absent 
congressionally legislated or constitutionally enumerated 
authority or exception. By comparison and contrast, The Reserve 
components of the Armed Forces are: The Army National Guard of 
the United States, The Army Reserve, The Navy Reserve, The 
Marine Corps Reserve, The Air National Guard of the United 
States, The Air Force Reserve, and The Coast Guard Reserve (10 
U.S.C. § 10101).28 Federal troops use exceptions to the 
Insurrection Act and Posse Comitatus Act would be intelligence, 
military equipment, training, advice or facilities usage, amongst 
other matters in support of civilian law enforcement under 10 
U.S.C. § 381,29 or troop employment and deployment during a 
                                                                                                     
 27. 6 U.S.C. § 466 (2012). 
 28. 10 U.S.C. § 10101 (2012); see also John H. Ebbighausen, Unity of 
Command for Homeland Security: Title 32, Title 10, or a Combination, DEF. TECH. 
INFO. CTR (2006), http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA451789 
(explaining history of the National Guard) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice); see also NCC Staff, An Important 
Landmark Anniversary for the National Guard, NAT’L CONST. CTR. (June 3, 
2016), http://blog.constitutioncenter.org/2016/06/an-important-landmark-
anniversaryfor-the-national-guard/ (citing with authority The National Defense 
Act, Pub.L. 64–85, 39 Stat. 166, enacted June 3, 1916) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 29. 18 U.S.C. § 381 (2012). 
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biological, radiological, or nuclear event under 18 U.S.C. § 382.30 
Also, § 1004 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 1991, as amended,31 
allowed the Secretary of Defense to provide support for the 
counterdrug activities of any other department or agency of the 
federal government or of any state, local, or foreign law 
enforcement agency if certain criteria, set out in the statute 
[were] met.32  
Under that authority, in September 2011, the GAO reported 
$1.35 billion in costs for DOD support to the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) in two separate counternarcotics border 
operations in four border states—Operation Jump Start and 
Operation Phalanx—conducted by National Guard forces in Title 
32 status from June 2006 to July 2008 and from June 2010 through 
September 30, 2011, respectively.33 The GAO further noted that 
between 1989 and 2011, the DOD “estimate[d] the cost of using 
active duty Title 10 forces nationwide in support of drug law 
enforcement agencies (with additional operational costs borne by 
the military services) at about $10 million annually.”34 
The 1988 Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency 
Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5207) authorizes the President 
to release federal funds and assistance to states for use in disaster 
response and declare an emergency or major disaster at the 
request of a state (or US territory) governor, as well as the mayor 
of Washington, D.C.35 What the Stafford Act does not authorize is 
the use of the military to perform law enforcement functions 
ordinarily prohibited by the Posse Comitatus Act. 
The Heritage Foundation has assessed that “[a]fter the 
passage of the Stafford Act in 1988, the number of declared federal 
disasters dramatically changed, steadily rising from an average of 
                                                                                                     
 30. 18 U.S.C. § 382 (2012). 
 31. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, H.R. Res. 4739, 
101st Cong. (1990) (enacted). 
 32. Davi M. D’Agostino, Observations on the Costs and Benefits of an 
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 33. Id. at 3. 
 34. Id.  
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28 per year under President Ronald Reagan, to an average of 130 
per year under Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama.”36 
An “emergency” under the Stafford Act is “any occasion or instance 
for which . . . Federal assistance is needed to supplement State 
and local efforts and capabilities . . . or to lessen or avert the threat 
of a catastrophe.”37 A “major disaster” is defined as “any natural 
catastrophe (including any hurricane, tornado, storm, high water, 
wind-driven water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic 
eruption, landslide, mudslide, snowstorm, or drought), or, 
regardless of cause, any fire, flood, or explosion.”38  
Upon the request of the governor, the President may task the 
DOD to provide any emergency work the President deems 
essential for the preservation of life and property in the immediate 
aftermath up to ten days prior to a presidential declaration of an 
emergency or major disaster.39 Emergency work can include the 
clearance and removal of debris and wreckage and the restoration 
of essential public facilities and services.40  
The declaration of an emergency under the Stafford Act 
requires that the governor of the affected state first make a 
determination that the situation is of such severity and magnitude 
that the state is unable to respond effectively without federal 
assistance, which determination must include a detailed definition 
of the type and amount of federal aid required, except where the 
President determines that a disaster implicates preeminently 
federal interests.41 
Finally, DOD policy under color of the Stafford Act allows 
commanders to provide immediate response in the guise of 
resources and assistance to civil authorities prior to, or in the 
                                                                                                     
 36. David Inserra, Top 5 Priorities for Homeland Security in 2016, HERITAGE 
FOUND. (Jan. 11, 2016), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/ 2016/01/top-5-
priorities-for-homeland-security-in-2016 (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 37. 42 U.S.C. § 5122(1) (2012). 
 38. Id. § 5122(2). 
 39. Id. § 5170b; see also Jennifer Elsea & R. Chuck Mason, The Use of 
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 40. Id. at 4. 
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absence of a declaration if disaster overwhelms the capabilities of 
local authorities and necessitates immediate action “to save lives, 
prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage 
within the United States” but “does not permit actions that would 
subject civilians to the use of military power that is regulatory, 
prescriptive, or compulsory.”42  
Aside from the Stafford Act basis for support, Section 1208 of 
the 1990 National Defense Authorization Act43 has allowed the 
Secretary of Defense to transfer to Federal and State agencies 
personal property of the Department of Defense, including small 
arms and ammunition, that the Secretary determines is: 
(A) suitable for use by such agencies in counter-drug activities; and 
(B) excess to the needs of the Department of Defense.44 In 1996, 
Congress replaced Section 1208 with Section 1033,45 which 
subsequently became 10 U.S.C. § 2576a.46  
The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) notes that “[s]ince its 
inception, the 1033 program has transferred more than $5.1 billion 
worth of property. In 2013 alone, $449,309,003.71 worth of 
property was transferred to law enforcement.”47 As part of its 
outreach to civilian agencies, the DLA predicted that ”[i]f your law 
enforcement agency chooses to participate, it may become one of 
the more than 8,000 participating agencies to increase its 
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 46. 10 U.S.C. § 2576a (2012). 
 47. Kevin H. Govern, Defense Support of Civil Authorities to Natural and 
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capabilities, expand its patrol coverage, reduce response times, 
and save the American taxpayer’s investment.”48 Critics of the 
program, such as the ACLU, claimed “a disturbing range of 
military gear [is] being transferred to civilian police departments 
nationwide” and alleged “one-third of all war materiel parceled 
out to state, local, and tribal police agencies is brand new.”49  
As “one of the five armed forces within the US and the only 
military organization within the [DHS],” the US Coast Guard 
(USCG), under 14 U.S.C. §§ 1–894, is the “[N]ation’s leading 
maritime law enforcement agency” with “broad, multi-faceted 
jurisdictional authority” limited neither by the Insurrection Act 
nor by the Posse Comitatus Act.50 However, under 14 U.S.C. § 3 
as amended by section 211 of the Coast Guard and Maritime 
Transportation Act of 2006,51 the USCG operates as a service in 
the Department of the Navy upon the declaration of war and 
when Congress so directs in the declaration, or when the 
President so directs.52 
President George W. Bush signed The Homeland Security 
Act of 200253 into law on November 25, 2002,54 creating the DHS 
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 49. Matthew Harwood, To Terrify and Occupy, ACLU (Aug. 14, 2014, 9:59 
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 54. Office of the Press Secretary, President Bush Signs Homeland Security 
Act, WHITE HOUSE: PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH (Nov. 25, 2002), 
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as an organization to “lead the unified national effort to secure 
America, . . . prevent and deter terrorist attacks and protect 
against and respond to threats and hazards to the 
Nation, . . . ensure safe and secure borders, welcome lawful 
immigrants and visitors, and promote the free-flow of commerce.”55  
Empowering DHS to take a “nationwide approach for Federal, 
State, and local governments to work effectively and efficiently 
together to prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic 
incidents, regardless of cause, size, or complexity,”56 President 
Bush then issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 
(HSPD-5), assigning the responsibility of developing a National 
Incident Management System (NIMS) to the DHS secretary, 
including a mandate for an NRP (later called NRF). The following 
four HSPD-5 criteria define when the DHS shall assume overall 
Federal incident management coordination responsibilities: 
(1) A Federal department or agency acting under its own 
authority has requested DHS assistance, 
(2) The resources of State and local authorities are 
overwhelmed and Federal assistance has been requested, 
(3) More than one Federal department or agency has become 
substantially involved in responding to the incident, or 
(4) The Secretary has been directed by the President to assume 
incident management responsibilities.57 
The NRP authorized “immediate action to save lives, prevent 
human suffering, or mitigate property damage,” and a pre-
approved authority under in extremis “Immediate Response” 
conditions.58 The DOD considers imminently serious conditions 
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resulting from any civil emergency where time does not permit 
approval from higher headquarters.59 In these situations:  
[L]ocal military commanders and responsible officials from 
DOD components and agencies are authorized by DOD directive 
and pre-approval by the Secretary of Defense, subject to any 
supplemental direction that may be provided by their DOD 
component, to take necessary action to respond to requests of 
civil authorities consistent with the Posse Comitatus Act (18 
U.S.C. § 1385).60 
III. 20th and 21st Century Examples of Defense Support to Civil 
Authorities 
In recent United States history, there have been many 
instances and exemptions whereby federal (or federalized) troops 
were called upon to conduct brief operations to promote or restore 
law and order, other than training, on United States soil in 
accordance with an Executive Order or Proclamation under the 
Insurrection Act or some other exemption to the Posse Comitatus 
Act. The most salient of these examples will be discussed below. 
A. Early to Mid-20th Century 
In 1919, President Woodrow Wilson called out Federal troops 
to quell race riots in twenty cities across the United States, which 
commenced first in Chicago, ostensibly arising from postwar social 
tensions related to demobilizing World War I veterans and 
competition for jobs among ethnicities.61 In 1932, President 
Herbert Hoover called upon General Douglas MacArthur, with the 
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aid of his staff officers Majors George Patton and Dwight D. 
Eisenhower, to send US troops to displace and disperse a group of 
20,000 aggrieved WWI veterans (the so-called "Bonus Marchers") 
encamped on or near the Washington Mall; this infamous incident 
involved the first instance of MacArthur ignoring presidential 
directive, when he pursued veterans and families across the 
Anacostia River despite Hoover’s orders to stand down.62  
On Labor Day in 1934, textile workers in the northeast and 
southeastern US began a strike against their treatment by 
employers at the mills.63 In response to the strike, Georgia 
Governor Eugene Talmadge declared martial law, and arrested 
strikers who continued their protests.64 The first arrests, including 
many women workers, were from the Sargent and East Newnan 
Cotton Mills; carried out by bayonet-armed Georgia National 
Guardsmen, the strikers were transported by military trucks to 
Fort McPherson in Atlanta:  
[W]here the workers were incarcerated in outdoor holding cells 
formerly occupied by German prisoners of war during World 
War I. Those arrested were held there until the strike ended 
three weeks later, after the United Textile Workers (UTW) 
union received government assurances that the problems at 
southern textile mills would be investigated.65 
During 1946, President Harry S. Truman sent out federal troops 
against 800,000 striking railroad workers—the largest strike in 
America’s history—and Truman proposed legislation (which failed 
to pass) to draft striking workers into the Armed Forces.66 
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B. Mid to Late-20th Century 
The year 1957 saw President Eisenhower federalize Arkansas 
National Guard troops and send Active Component troops under 
Executive Order 1073067 to Little Rock, Arkansas to counter 
desegregation violence in the aftermath of the landmark Brown v. 
Topeka Board of Education case in which the United States 
Supreme Court ruled that segregated schools were “inherently 
unequal” and ordered that public schools be desegregated “with all 
deliberate speed.”68 In 1962, President John F. Kennedy sent 
16,000 Federal troops under the XVIII Airborne Corps69 to 
Mississippi to quell the so-called “Ole Miss Riot,” in conjunction 
with 123 Deputy Federal Marshals, 316 US Border Patrolmen, and 
97 Federal prison guards protecting James Meredith, an African-
American blocked from registering at the university.70 The task 
force arrested 200 persons, including the arrest for insurrection of 
a retired Major General Edwin A. Walker who resigned his 
commission after reprimand for political activity.71 In 1963 and 
1965, forces also deployed to Tuscaloosa, Tuskegee, and Selma, 
Alabama to counter racial violence as a result of the forced 
enrollment of African-American students and civil rights 
marches,72 and in 1967 to Detroit to suppress riots there.73 
The increasing number of domestic disturbances and 
anticipated threats to security gave rise in 1965 to the US Army 
Intelligence Command (USAINTC), the Army counterintelligence 
element conducting operations in the continental United States, 
utilizing 300 field and residents offices across the nation organized 
into seven Military Intelligence groups.74 After the August 1965 
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Los Angeles Watts rioting, USAINTC provided crisis support and 
contingency planning for collecting domestic intelligence under the 
STEEP HILL contingency plan to be implemented in the event of 
deployment of federal troops.75 That plan, redesigned GARDEN 
PLOT in 1967 (and still extant today) proved to be inadequate with 
respect to aiding Army commanders in civil disturbance 
situations;76 thus, subsequent collection plans (e.g., PUNCH 
BLOCK, LANTERN SPIKE), with respect to military 
counterintelligence collection and analysis, were separate from 
any federal or local law enforcement capabilities.77 
The years of 1967 and 1968 were especially significant—and 
tragic—with respect to military support to civilian authorities. The 
Newark, New Jersey riot response involved elements of the Army’s 
108th Military Intelligence Group at Ft. Devens, Massachusetts, 
and with the Army largely “limited to observing events, the whole 
burden fell upon the police and the National Guard, which reached 
a peak strength of 5,367 in Newark on 17 July [1967].”78 The 
Detroit Riots of 1967 involved 5,000 Federal troops and 17,000 law 
enforcement officers quelling one of the deadliest and most 
destructive riots in US history; reaction to a police raid of an 
unlicensed after-hours bar escalated to a loss of 43 lives, 467 
injuries, 7,200 arrests, and the destruction of 2,000 buildings.79 
The October 1967 march on the Pentagon was the first national 
protest against the Vietnam Conflict, during which 5,000–6,000 
armed Army troops deferred to 300 US Deputy Marshals to deal 
with 35,000 protesters, and ultimately to arrest 82.80 Race riots in 
110 cities across the United States ensued following the April 4, 
1968 assassination of the Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.,81 
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most critically affecting Washington D.C.; in the largest federal 
occupation on United States soil since the Civil War, the White 
House dispatched some 13,600 Federal troops, including the 3rd 
Infantry Division (Old Guard), and 1,750 federalized D.C. National 
Guard troops to augment civilian law enforcement and quell 
disturbances across the capitol city.82 Rioting spread to Chicago, 
Baltimore, and other cities across the nation as the “last of the 
great racial disturbances of the 1960s.”83 
On April 13, 1968, Secretary McGiffert took charge of the 
Department of Defense Civil Disturbance Steering Committee, 
with the US Deputy Attorney General as a member.84 The 
committee’s job was to advise the secretary of the Army in his 
capacity as the executive agent in dealing with civil disturbances 
or other lawlessness prejudicial to public order—all of which was 
soon to be formally authorized by DOD Directive 3025.12, 8 June 
1968.85 
The year 1970 saw the peaceful as well as lethal use of military 
force to deal with civil disturbance. The Postal Strike of that year 
involved over 200,000 workers in over 30 cities,86 in response to 
which President Richard Nixon ordered 18,500 troops into New 
York City under the DOD Postal Augmentation Plan, a/k/a 
Operation Graphic Hand, ostensibly to sort mail, but with follow-
on efforts of up to 115,000 troops to deploy to 35 cities if the strike 
continued.87 While Graphic Hand troops avoided confrontation, as 
did those who responded to the May 1970 New Haven 
demonstrations, the Ohio National Guard killed four unarmed 
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students, with twenty-eight guardsmen acknowledging having 
fired live rounds during the Kent State campus protests.88 
In a matter reflecting a 19th Century incident repeating itself 
in the late 20th Century, President Richard M. Nixon sent federal 
troops to Wounded Knee, SD in 1973 during a 71-day siege of 
properties occupied by American Indian Movement activists, with 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) cordoning off the area 
by using US Marshals and later National Guard units.89 
C. The Late 1970s through Early 1990s: Garden Plot Revisited 
President Jimmy Carter established the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) under the 1978 Reorganization Plan 
No. 3, and activated April 1, 1979, by Executive Order 12127.90 
Executive Order 12148 shifted disaster relief efforts to the new 
federal-level agency, and FEMA gained responsibility from DOD 
for the nation’s Civil Defense.91  
On September 20, 1989, President George H.W. Bush sent 
Active Component and federalized National Guard forces under 
Executive Order 1269092 to St. Croix, US Virgin Islands ostensibly 
at the request of the Territorial Governor to quell civil disturbance 
and provide disaster assistance to over 50,000 inhabitants after 
Hurricane Hugo damaged or destroyed over 90% of the island’s 
structures and created a significant number of hazardous oil 
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spills.93 Under the 1967 Garden Plot contingency plan, Joint Task 
Force (JTF) 140 brought together Army, Navy and Coast Guard 
elements, with a contingent from the US Marshals Service and the 
FBI, for Operation Hawkeye, FEMA’s first major test of disaster 
relief capabilities.94 Military Police, augmented by medical, 
engineer, legal and other support personnel enforced a dusk-to-
dawn curfew—but not martial law: they patrolled the island for 
two months, securing key installations; worked with the FBI and 
the US Marshals to apprehend several hundred escaped prisoners; 
intercepted air-dropped bundles of cocaine valued at over $50 
million; and carried out extensive training for the Virgin Island 
National Guard and conducted joint patrols with the St. Croix 
Police Department.95 
Six days in early May 1992 were filled with rioting, arson, 
murder and mayhem on the streets of Los Angeles following the 
controversial acquitting of officers involved in the Rodney King 
beating.96 Garden Plot yet again became the contingency plan 
under which some 10,000 activated California National Guard 
troops served alongside 2,500 Active Component troops, and 1,700 
federal law-enforcement officers from different agencies from 
across the state to put down disturbances. 
In August 1992, FEMA’s second major test came as Hurricane 
Andrew struck the Florida and Louisiana coasts with 165 mph 
winds, making 250,000 people homeless in the affected areas. 
Within five days, some 20,000 National Guard and 16,000 XVIII 
Airborne Corps troops97 deployed yet again under the Garden Plot 
contingency plan and FEMA’s oversight, and by October, all 
disaster relief functions were eventually turned over to civilian 
contractors and Corps units returned to Ft. Bragg.98 In its 
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ARMY LAWYERS IN MILITARY OPERATIONS FROM VIETNAM TO HAITI 276–78 (2001). 
 96. SCHEIPS, supra note 20, at 441–49.   
 97. Dale Carroll, Lessons Learned from Hurricane Andrew (Apr. 15, 1996), 
http://www.iaff.org/hs/disasterrelief/resources/jointtaskforce.pdf.  
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February 1993 report, "Coping with Catastrophe," the National 
Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) found that “major 
changes were needed—in the White House, in Congress, in FEMA, 
in other federal agencies, and in the states and localities.”99 NAPA 
identified several basic paradigms in preparedness for national 
security emergencies and domestic civilian emergency 
preparedness and response that were causes of the failed response, 
and proposed a “comprehensive set of recommendations to address 
the causes of the nation’s inadequate response to … catastrophic 
events.”100 
D. The Early 2000s Through the 2010s—Putting the National 
Response Plan (Framework) To Test 
Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the 2002 
Unified Command Plan (UCP)101 established U.S. Northern 
Command (NORTHCOM) to plan, organize and execute homeland 
defense and civil support missions—marking the first time these 
missions fell under the direction of a single unified command.102 
NORTHCOM’s region of responsibility includes the continental 
United States, Alaska, Canada and Mexico, including the Gulf of 
Mexico and Straits of Florida as well as water space extending to 
approximately 500 nautical miles from the coast.103 U.S. Army 
North/Fifth Army (USARNORTH), at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, is 
both the joint forces land component command (JFLCC) and the 
Army service component command (ASCC) to NORTHCOM.104 
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Most relevant to military support to civil authorities, 
USARNORTH’s responsibilities are: 
• Execute DOD’s homeland defense and civil support operations 
in the land domain. 
• Further develop, organize and integrate DOD CBRNE response 
capabilities and operations. 
• Build the capability to perform the Joint Force Land 
Component Command and the Army Service Component 
Command functions. 
• Secure land approaches to the homeland. 
• Continue to build a highly competent, disciplined workforce in 
a world class organization.105 
USARNORTH appointed Defense Coordinating Officers, to be 
assigned to all ten FEMA regional offices, to more effectively 
coordinate the availability and employment of DOD resources.106  
Notwithstanding the realignment of FEMA under the new 
DHS, and the lessons which should have been learned during 
Hurricane Andrew and prior troop deployments, federal and state 
response plans were not adequately revised or rehearsed before the 
fateful natural disasters to come. Those events were the August–
September 2005 disasters of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the first 
and ninth most costly and devastating Atlantic hurricanes ever 
recorded.107 Within the United States, and as delineated in the 
then-extant NRP, disaster response and planning was first and 
foremost a local government responsibility. States had the option 
of receiving disaster assistance in accordance with numerous inter-
jurisdictional mutual aid agreements, such as the Emergency 
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Management Assistance Compact (EMAC),108 under which 20,000 
civilians and 46,500 Active and National Guard personnel were 
deployed to the Gulf Coast region to respond to these disasters.109  
Aside from an estimated $200 billion cleanup cost,110 the 
Inspector General of the DHS said “his office had received 
accusations of fraud and waste in the multibillion-dollar relief 
programs linked to Hurricane Katrina.”111 Many agencies, 
including the military, sought the opportunity—and resources—to 
“get well” and become fully equipped and ready to deploy instantly 
in a crisis; for instance, the then-Chief of the National Guard 
Bureau testified to a Congressional Committee in September 2005 
that $1.3 billion was needed immediately, part of $7 billion for 
“radios, trucks, construction machinery, and medical gear” was 
needed for the National Guard alone.112 
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Id. 
The continued trend towards increased resourcing for the National Guard and 
Army Reserve forces included an Army 2017 budget that requests “a near 
doubling in the Army funding line that pays for involuntary mobilizations . . . 
compared with the amount officials requested in 2016” in order to cope with 
“ongoing readiness strains within its active duty force” and a “significant uptick 
in its use of National Guard and Army Reserve forces to handle missions in 
combatant commands throughout the world.” Jared Serbu, Army wants more 
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On September 14, 2007, the DOD’s Joint Staff produced 
overarching guidelines and principles to assist commanders and 
their staffs in planning, conducting, and assessing DSCA, in the 
guise of Joint Publication (JP) 3-28, Civil Support.113 In February 
2013, JP 3-28 was supplemented by a Multi-Service Tactics, 
Techniques, And Procedures (MTTP) publication for DSCA and 
integrating with national guard civil support,114 and the 2007 
version of JP 3-28 was superseded by, and updated through, the 
July 31, 2013 issuance of JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil 
Authorities, which “provides the doctrinal basis for interagency 
coordination during DSCA operations.”115 
The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) acknowledged 
the increasing importance of DOD in assisting civil authorities and 
defending the nation from direct attacks, stating, “when 
responding to an event within the United States, the Department 
of Defense will almost always be in a supporting role.”116 To 
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AUTH’S (July 31, 2013), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_28.pdf.  
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confront these security challenges, DOD, as stated in the 2010 
QDR, intended to reorganize its domestic CBRNE consequence 
management enterprise, largely toward state National Guard. As 
part of this initiative, DOD has been working to create Homeland 
Response Forces (HRFs) tailored to deal with CBRNE incidents yet 
to come in America’s future.117 
A significant change to the law came on December 31, 2011, 
with the amendment of Title 10 (specifically 10 U.S.C. § 12304a) 
ordering the Army Reserve, Navy Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, 
and Air Force Reserve to active duty to provide assistance in 
response to a major disaster or emergency. When a governor 
requests federal assistance in responding to a major disaster or 
emergency, the secretary of defense may, without the consent of 
the member affected, order any unit and any member of the Army 
Reserve, Navy Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, and Air Force 
Reserve to active duty for a continuous period of not more than 120 
days to respond to the governor’s request.118  
The revisions that resulted in the NRF were put to the test 
during the fall of 2012, when Hurricane Sandy and the northeaster 
that swept through the Mid-Atlantic and Northeastern United 
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 117. Id.; see also Le Jeune, supra note 104, at 4. Christine Le Jeune of the 
Institute of Land Warfare, Association of the United States Army (AUSA) noted 
that:  
Several states have already announced plans for development of HRFs 
for each FEMA region: Ohio and Washington will launch units by 
October 2011, and California, Georgia, Massachusetts, Missouri, New 
York, Pennsylvania, Texas and Utah will follow suit in 2012. Each unit 
will focus on planning, training and exercising at the regional level 
when not engaged in consequence management operations. If 
necessary, HRFs will function alongside other National Guard-sourced 
CBRNE consequence management forces that are employed by the 
governors. These forces include 57 weapons of mass destruction civil 
support teams (WMD-CSTs) and 17 CBRNE enhanced response force 
packages (CERFPs), as well as federally-controlled elements such as 
defense CBRNE response forces (DCRFs) and two consequence 
management command and control elements for follow-on forces. 
Current thought within the National Guard Bureau is that this new 
construct is more responsive with a better match of lifesaving 
capabilities and allows for an improved balance between state and 
federal control. 
Id. 
 118. 10 U.S.C. § 12304a (2012). 
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States required that the DOD provide emergency temporary power 
and pumping capability and to distribute fuel, food, cold-weather 
clothing, and other comfort items as requested by civil 
authorities.119 Some 4,000 Active Component NORTHCOM 
personnel supported Hurricane Sandy relief operations in the 
affected area, alongside 6,618 National Guard personnel from New 
York, New Jersey, Connecticut and West Virginia assisting in 
response and recovery efforts across their affected states.120  
In May 2013, NORTHCOM coordinated DOD-provided 
support to the FEMA and state and local response activities in 
response to tornado-devastated areas in Oklahoma.121 The 
command activated the Region VI Defense Coordinating Officer, 
and the Defense Coordinating Element to Moore, Oklahoma, to 
validate, plan and coordinate potential DOD support of FEMA’s 
disaster response operations. It also deployed search-and-rescue 
coordinators as part of the Federal Search and Rescue 
Coordination Group (FSARCG), and to facilitate DOD’s support of 
potential life-saving and response operations. DOD will provide 
regional knowledge, requirements validation, and liaison support 
to the affected areas.122  
Natural disasters continued during the summer of 2013, 
especially in the guise of wildfires. Personnel and equipment from 
Colorado-based military installations assisted local, state and 
federal authorities in battling the June 2013 Black Forest Fire in 
the southern part of the state.123 Support was provided through 
several authorities, NORTHCOM officials said, including mission 
assignments, immediate response authority and mutual aid 
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agreements. 124 At least 150 Colorado National Guard troops, along 
with their equipment, were employed to contain 65% of blazes, 
affecting a twenty-two-square-mile area with at least two fatalities 
and the destruction of nearly 500 homes,125 with the mission 
complete by June 22, 2013.126 Arizona National Guardsmen along 
with California and North Carolina Air National Guard tankers 
and crewmembers joined the response to wildfires that killed 
nineteen civilian firefighters in the first week of July 2013.127 
Towards the end of predicting future natural disasters on the 
basis of past patterns, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency 
(NGA– formerly NPIC) began in the fall of 2013 “to create a global 
geographic intelligence database that can anticipate future world 
trouble spots and humanitarian crises by combining detailed 
mapping with information about trends, demographics and 
weather patterns in those areas.”128 The NGA publicly discloses it 
is an agency for the Department of Defense that manages and 
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TODAY, Nov. 19, 2013, 9:45 AM, http://www.usatoday.com/story/ 
nation/2013/11/19/nga-geoanalytics-map-natural-disasters/3628911/ (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).  
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provides imagery and geospatial information for diverse military, 
civil, and international needs.129 It further discloses that, amongst 
its many missions, it “assists humanitarian and disaster relief 
efforts by working directly with the lead federal agencies 
responding to fires, floods, earthquakes, landslides, hurricanes or 
other natural or manmade disasters.”130 Such a geospatial 
database may prove useful if not indispensable in dealing with 
both foreign and domestic natural and man-made disasters. 
From April 28 through May 3, 2014, another series of domestic 
natural disasters occurred, including deadly severe storms, 
tornadoes and flooding; in the aftermath of destruction, National 
Guard members worked, “in coordinated efforts with civilian 
agencies . . . responding to communities in several states across 
the south.”131  
At least 62,000 unaccompanied children from Central America 
came across the US-Mexico border from the fall of 2013 up through 
the time of this writing, more than twice the number that came the 
previous year; they were, in the estimation of NORTHCOM 
Commander General Jacoby, fleeing gang activity yet “seeking 
legal entry into the U.S.”132 General Jacoby said “the lawlessness 
in Central America could spawn ‘hybrid’ organizations that deal in 
terrorism, posing a threat to US national security.”133 In providing 
defense support to the Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS), NORTHCOM established a temporary housing facility at 
Joint Base San Antonio-Lackland, Texas, for the unaccompanied 
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children stopped by US Border Patrol who are now being cared for 
by HHS’s Administration for Children and Families (ACF).134 
On July 21, 2014, the rapid influx of those so-called “border 
kids” across the Mexico-U.S. border prompted Texas Governor 
Rick Perry to controversially deploy 1,000 Title 32 National Guard 
troops along the 1,254-mile border as part of the ongoing Operation 
Strong Safety.135 That “multi-agency law enforcement initiative,” 
first launched in the fall of 2013, was intended “to address three 
public safety issues identified in the region: 1) significant criminal 
activity; 2) significant number of commercial vehicles on the 
roadways; and 3) unsafe driving practices.”136 Governor Perry 
“guaranteed that the National Guard w[ould] remain on the border 
at least for . . . three months, which is the time that the $36 million 
in the state budget that can be used to pay for them w[ould] 
last.”137 Prior to that deployment, Lieutenant General (retired) H. 
Steven Blum, former Chief of the National Guard Bureau from 
2003 to 2009 told the media: 
There may be many other organizations that might more 
appropriately be called upon. If you’re talking about search and 
rescue, maintaining the rule of law or restoring conditions back 
to normal after a natural disaster or a catastrophe, the 
[National] Guard is superbly suited to that. I’m not so sure that 
what we’re dealing with in scope and causation right now would 
make it the ideal choice.138 
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The deployment became a political campaign matter as well, 
with Democratic Texas gubernatorial candidate Wendy Davis 
“question[ing] the deployment of . . . troops on the border with 
Mexico to curtail illegal immigration and she promised, if elected, 
that she will study withdrawing them.”139 
The previously discussed “1033 program,” coupled with 
National Guard deployment in Ferguson, MO, became the subject 
of critical media focus in the wake of police response to riots in 
August 2014, following the police shooting of crime suspect Mike 
Brown.140 In response to calls for “demilitarization” of the police, 
Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr. said “[a]t a time when we must 
seek to rebuild trust between law enforcement and the local 
community . . . I am deeply concerned that the deployment of 
military equipment and vehicles sends a conflicting message.”141 
On Friday, August 15, 2014, Senate Armed Services Chair Carl 
Levin (D-MI) called for a review of the so-called 1033 program.142 
Missouri Democratic Senator Claire McCaskill, the chairman 
of the Subcommittee on Financial & Contracting Oversight, also 
announced she would lead a hearing on the program, and 
introduced on May 7, 2015 the Protecting Communities and Police 
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Act intended to “reform federal programs that send equipment and 
funding to local police departments.”143 
In the fall of 2014, President Obama “ordered a comprehensive 
review of the government’s decade-old strategy of outfitting local 
police departments with military-grade body armor, mine-
resistant trucks, silencers and automatic rifles;” the result was the 
January 15, 2015 Executive Order 13688 Federal Support for Local 
Law Enforcement Equipment Acquisition, and subsequent May 
18, 2015, Law Enforcement Working Group Recommendations 
Pursuant to Executive Order 13688, directing executive 
departments and agencies to better coordinate their efforts to 
operate and oversee the provision of controlled equipment and 
funds for controlled equipment to law enforcement agencies.144  
Both the Executive Order and ensuing Working Group 
Recommendations responded, in no small part, to accountability 
problems at the “184 state and local police agencies reportedly 
suspended from the 1033 Program for losing weapons or failing to 
comply with other stipulations.”145 Notably, the nationally known 
                                                                                                     
 143. See Caroline May, McCaskill Announces Hearing on Police 
Militarization, BREITBART (Aug. 22, 2014), http://www.breitbart.com/big-
government/2014/08/22/mccaskill-announces-hearing-on-police-militarization/ 
(noting that Senator McCaskill is “the chairman of the Subcommittee on 
Financial & Contracting Oversight”) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice); United States Senator Claire 
McCaskill, With Protecting Communities And Police Act, McCaskill Aims to 
Reform Federal Programs that Send Equipment to Local Police, (May 7, 2015), 
http://www.mccaskill.senate.gov/media-center/news-releases/with-protecting-
communities-and-police-act-mccaskill-aims-to-reform-federal-programs-that-
send-equipment-to-local-police (providing commentary on the “Protecting 
Communities and Police Act” and the proposed text) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 144. Matt Apuzzo & Michael S. Schmidt, In Washington, Second Thoughts On 
Arming Police, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com 
/2014/08/24/us/in-washington-second-thoughts-on-arming-police.html?_r=0 (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice); 
Recommendations Pursuant to Executive Order 13688 Federal Support for Local 
Law Enforcement, WHITE HOUSE (May, 2015), https://m.white 
house.gov/sites/default/files/docs/le_equipment_wg_final_report_final.pd; Exec. 
Order No. 12,360, 80 Fed. Reg. 3,451 (Jan. 16, 2015). 
 145. Megan Cassidy, MCSO missing nine weapons from Pentagon’s 1033 
program, AZ CENTRAL (Aug. 27, 2014, 7:44 AM), http://www. 
azcentral.com/story/news/local/phoenix/2014/08/26/mcso-weapons-pentagon-
suspension-1033/14659089/ (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil 
Rights and Social Justice); see also Daniel Rivero & Jorge Rivas, How Did 
America’s Police Departments Lose Loads Of Military-Issued Weapons?, FUSION 
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sheriff of Maricopa County, Joe Arpaio, admitted on August 26, 
2014 that his department had been suspended from the program 
and is currently missing nine firearms (“eight .45-caliber pistols 
and one M-16 rifle”) issued to the agency out of “200 weapons from 
the surplus program.”146 Some 20 to 22 weapons were unaccounted 
for over the years, but roughly half were recovered from retired or 
current deputies who, incredibly, had brought them home.147 
Under the “1033 Program,” the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office 
amassed an arsenal of “a Hummer, a tank, 90 M-16 rifles, 116 .45-
caliber pistols, 34 M-14 rifles and three helicopters.”148 
In contrast to media hyperbole regarding the program, the 
Public Affairs Officer for the Defense Logistics Agency responsible 
for the “1033 Program,” reports on the scope and accountability of 
the program that: 
It’s important to note that 95 percent of items provided through 
the 1033 program are non-tactical—e.g., computers, office 
furniture, and tools—making the program a valuable source of 
supply for cash-strapped police forces. And requests for tactical 
items must be reviewed and approved by a governor-appointed 
coordinator in each state before the equipment is released . . . . 
The 1033 program database is housed on a Defense Department 
public website and citizens can view what their local law 
enforcement agencies have acquired from the program at any 
time. 149 
On August 22, 2014 Missouri Governor Jay Nixon started to 
withdraw National Guard forces some five days after being 
                                                                                                     
(Aug. 25, 2014, 2:01 PM), http://fusion.net/leadership/story/americas-police-
departments-lose-loads-military-issued-weapons-984250 (noting “that 184 state 
and local police departments have been suspended from the Pentagon’s ‘1033 
program’ for missing weapons or failure to comply with other guidelines”) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 146. Cassidy, supra note 145. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. See Susan Lowe, Letter to the Editor, Agency: Most Military Surplus 
Items given to Police are ‘Non-tactical’, SYRACUSE.COM (Apr. 26, 2016), 
http://www.syracuse.com/opinion/index.ssf/2016/04/defense_department_most_
surplus_items_given_to_police_are_non-tactical_your_lett.html (explaining 
purpose of program in letter written by Public Affairs Officer of the Defense 
Logistics Agency) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights 
and Social Justice); Govern, Defense Support of Civil Authorities to Natural and 
Man-Made Disasters, supra note 47, at 806. 
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dispatched to Ferguson to help “quell the unrest;” seven months 
later and 825 miles away, another deployment of 2,000-plus 
soldiers took place, this time from the Maryland National Guard, 
called out on April 28, 2015 to assist State Police efforts to prevent 
widespread unrest in Baltimore after the funeral of Freddie Gray 
who died while in police custody.150 
IV. The Framework for Future National Response to Disasters 
and Emergencies 
The second edition of the NRF, updated in May 2013, provides 
context for how the whole community works together and how 
response efforts under the myriad of documents cited up to this 
point relate to all other parts of national preparedness.151 The NRF 
remains the primary instrument for applying Federal capabilities 
during disaster response.152 It is one of the five documents of a set 
of National Planning Frameworks, with each covering one 
                                                                                                     
 150. Campbell Robertson & Marc Santora, National Guard Troops Begin to 
Leave Ferguson, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/ 
08/23/us/ferguson-missouri-protests.html?_r=0> (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice); Kyle Jahner, 2,000 National 
Guard Troops Fan Out Across Baltimore, ARMY TIMES (Apr. 28 2015), 
http://www.armytimes.com/story/military/guard-reserve/2015/04/28/baltimore-
national-guard-mission-freddie-gray-protests/26529499/ (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). At the time of 
this writing, the New York Times reported: 
More than a year after the charges were announced, the prosecution is 
set to begin anew with the trial of Officer Edward M. Nero, who was 
present for the initial arrest of Mr. Gray. Trials of the remaining four 
officers, in addition to a retrial for Officer Porter, will follow on a 
schedule that stretches into the fall of 2016. Retrial for Officer Porter, 
will follow on a schedule that stretches into the [fall of 2016]. 
Jess Bidgood, 2nd Officer’s Trial Over Freddie Gray Nears as Baltimore Tries to 
Move On, N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/10/us/2nd-
officers-trial-over-freddie-gray-nears-as-baltimore-tries-to-move-on.html (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice); Jaweed 
Kaleem & Matt Pearce, Riots in Milwaukee after Police Shooting: ‘The People are 
Fed Up,” L.A. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-
milwaukee-unrest-20160814-snap-story.html (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 151. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., NAT’L RESPONSE FRAMEWORK, (2d ed., 2013), 
https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1914-25045-1246/final_national_ 
response_framework_20130501.pdf. 
 152. Panetta, supra note 16, at 8. 
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preparedness mission area: Prevention, Protection, Mitigation, 
Response or Recovery.153 Replacing the 2008 NRF, which 
superseded the corresponding sections of the NRP (2004, with 2006 
revisions), it presents the DHS’ guiding principles that “enable the 
whole community to work together to prevent, protect against, 
mitigate, respond to, and recover from the effects of incidents 
regardless of cause, size, location, or complexity.”154 In its most 
current iteration, the NRF establishes a comprehensive, national, 
all-hazards approach to domestic incident response. When Federal 
military and civilian personnel and resources are authorized to 
support civil authorities, command of those forces will remain with 
the Secretary of Defense. DOD elements in the incident area of 
operations and National Guard forces under the command of a 
Governor will coordinate closely with response organizations at all 
levels.155 
The government has an inherent emergency power, in 
addition to those powers specifically set forth in law, as well as 
executive order, and policy.  In addition to the Posse Comitatus 
Act, The Insurrection Act, and the Stafford Act, Executive Order 
12630, provides for governmental actions and interference with 
constitutionally protected property rights.156 Department of 
Defense regulations assert another exception that does not rest on 
statutory authority, but is available in very limited circumstances 
and covers: 
Actions that are taken under the inherent right of the U.S. 
Government . . . to ensure the preservation of public order and 
to carry out governmental operations within its territorial 
limits, or otherwise in accordance with applicable law, by force, 
if necessary.157 
                                                                                                     
 153. National Planning Frameworks, FEMA, http://www.fema.gov/national-
planning-frameworks (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil 
Rights and Social Justice). 
 154. Panetta, supra note 16, at 3. 
 155. See id. (“Dep’t of Def. is a supporting agency for each of the 15 Emergency 
Support Functions (ESFs) and each of the 6 Incident Annexes of the National 
Response Framework.”). For an explanation of the 15 ESFs, and the 6 Incident 
Annexes of the National Response Framework see DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra 
note 151. 
 156. Exec. Order No. 12,360, 53 Fed. Reg. 8,859 (Mar. 15, 1988). 
 157. See Elsea & Mason, supra note 39, at 3 (citing DEP’T OF DEF. DIRECTIVE 
NO. 5525.5, DOD COOPERATION WITH CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS, ENCL. 
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The emergency power, according to DOD directives, is available to 
protect Federal property and functions, and to authorize 
prompt and vigorous Federal action, including use of military 
forces, to prevent loss of life or wanton destruction of property 
and to restore governmental functioning and public order when 
sudden and unexpected civil disturbances, disaster, or 
calamities seriously endanger life and property and disrupt 
normal governmental functions to such an extent that duly 
constituted local authorities are unable to control the 
situation.158 
When employed or deployed after civil disturbances or natural 
disasters, federal troops from the DOD would and will receive 
direction from FEMA, in accordance with the NRF to work solo or 
in concert with other federal agencies to provide personnel, 
equipment, supplies, facilities, and managerial, technical, and 
advisory services. Support scenarios could include: a Presidential 
Declaration of a Major Disaster;159 an Order to Perform Emergency 
Work Essential for the Preservation of Life and Property;160 and, a 
Presidential Declaration of an Emergency.161 
                                                                                                     
4, 14 (Jan. 15, 1986), http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/d5525_5.pdf). 
 158. Id. 
 159. Disaster Declarations, FEMA, http://www.fema.gov/disasters (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 160. AIR UNIV., FED. RESPONSE PLAN, BASIC PLAN 7 (2003), 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/frp/frpbasic.pdf. 
 161. See 50 U.S.C. §1621 (2012). This declaration under Congressional 
statutory and Article II Constitutional authority provides that: 
(a) With respect to Acts of Congress authorizing the exercise, during 
the period of a national emergency, of any special or extraordinary 
power, the President is authorized to declare such national emergency. 
Such proclamation shall immediately be transmitted to the Congress 
and published in the Federal Register.  
(b) Any provisions of law conferring powers and authorities to be 
exercised during a national emergency shall be effective and remain in 
effect  
(1) only when the President (in accordance with 
subsection (a) of this section), specifically declares a 
national emergency, and  
(2) only in accordance with this chapter. No law enacted 
after September 14, 1976, shall supersede this 
subchapter unless it does so in specific terms, referring 
to this subchapter, and declaring that the new law 
supersedes the provisions of this subchapter.  
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In all but the instance of a Presidential Declaration of 
Emergency, the governor of an affected state or territory must 
request assistance regardless of any state or local capacity to 
render disaster assistance.162 The NRF allows DHS to coordinate 
federal agencies that work alongside state and local agencies. In 
the words of past DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff, these scenarios 
do not "supersede the state and local government," but "fit with the 
state and local government in a comprehensive response plan."163 
Plans are only useful if reviewed, rehearsed, and effectively 
implemented when contingencies arise. Towards that end, the 
DHS exhorts that effective preparedness is a critical precondition 
for successful response, and encourages a “higher level of 
readiness” of “engaged partnerships with elected and appointed 
officials, dedicated emergency management practitioners, 
nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector, “by 
drawing a sharper focus on the value of the following preparedness 
activities: planning, organizing, training, equipping, exercising, 
and applying lessons learned.164 For end-users of the NRF, 
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In addition to such immediate response authority, military installations may 
have concluded mutual aid agreements with local agencies based on pre-
coordinated conditions regarding fire, emergency medical services, hazardous 
materials, and public safety, and may also receive requests for assistance via an 
action requires form in a mission assignment process. See DEP’T OF DEF. 
INSTRUCTION 6055.17, DOD INSTALLATION EMERGENCY MGMT. (IEM) PROGRAM 
(Jan. 13, 2009) (incorporating Change 1 (Nov. 19, 2010)), 
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/605517p.pdf. With regards to response 
for all-hazards incidents, see DEP’T OF DEF. INSTRUCTION 3020.40, DOD POLICY AND 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 14 (Jan. 14, 2010) (incorporating 
Change 2 (Sept. 21, 2012)), http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/d3020_40.pdf; DEP’T OF 
DEF. INSTRUCTION 3020.45, DEF. CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAM (DCIP) MGMT 
(Apr. 21, 2008), http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/302045p.pdf; DEP’T OF 
DEF. INSTRUCTION 3020.52, DOD INSTALLATION CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, 
RADIOLOGICAL, NUCLEAR, AND HIGH-YIELD EXPLOSIVE (CBRNE) PREPAREDNESS 
STANDARDS (May 18, 2002), http://www.dtic.mil/ whs/directives/corres/pdf/302052p.pdf; 
DEP’T OF DEF. INSTRUCTION 6440.03, DOD LAB. NETWORK (DLN) (June 10, 2011) 
http://www.dtic.mil/ whs/directives/corres/pdf/644003p.pdf. 
 162. CSIS & ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, FED. AUTH.’S FOR DISASTER RESPONSE 1 
(2005), http://csis.org/files/media/csis/events/051128_rolesauthorities.pdf. 
 163. Federal Officials Hold News Conference on Katrina Response, CNN (Aug. 
15 2005), Transcript, http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0508/ 
31/lol.01.html (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and 
Social Justice). 
 164. FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, NATION RESPONSE FRAMEWORK (NRF)-
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preserving, and protecting private and public assets, the 
“[m]astery of these key functions supports unity of effort, and thus 
[the] ability to save lives, protect property, and meet basic human 
needs.”165 
The future is unpredictable, so in conjunction with state and 
federal plans, cities across the United States are taking steps to be 
in a better position to respond to disasters. USA Today reported 
that many local preparedness plans focus on how to protect critical 
infrastructure and how to keep critical systems functioning during 
and after a natural and man-made disaster.166 The Rockefeller 
Foundation announced in May 2013 that it would fund “Chief 
Resilience Officer” (CRO) positions in 100 cities, on six continents 
in 20 countries for five years.167 In April 2014, San Francisco 
became the first city to benefit from a CRO; Patrick Otellini brings 
to the CRO role a background in public policy, private sector 
dealings with complex planning, building and fire code issues, and 
experience as San Francisco’s Director of Earthquake Safety.168 
Chicago became the most recent city, at the time of this writing, to 
hire a CRO, formerly the deputy commissioner in the city’s 
Department of Water Management since 2012.169 “CROs will have 
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 165. Sarah Twombly, Q & A with The World’s First Chief Resilience Officer, 
ROCKEFELLER FOUND. (Apr. 9, 2014), http://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/ blog/q-
with-worlds-first-chief-resilience (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of 
Civil Rights and Social Justice). By June 4, 2014, the world’s second CRO had 
been appointed, outside the U.S. in Medellin, Colombia. See Sarah Twombly, 
Introducing Medellin’s Chief Resilience Officer, ROCKEFELLER FOUND. (June 4, 
2014), http://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/blog/introducing-medellins-chief-
resilience (expanding on concept of Chief Resilience Officer) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 166. Greg Toppo, Cities Step Up Disaster-Response Planning, USA TODAY 
(June 9, 2013, 6:48 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/ 
2013/06/09/cities-resilience-officer/2373911/ (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 167. See id. (explaining that CROs will work to ensure cities will “emerge even 
stronger from these kinds of shocks and stresses,” Rockefeller president Judith 
Rodin further told USA Today, “[W]e can’t predict everything, but we can prepare 
for many things and prepare our capacity to rebound more effectively when they 
hit.”).  
 168. Twombly, supra note 165.  
 169. Nausheen Husain, Data: Eyeing Sustainability, Chicago Hires First 
Resilience Officer, CHI. TRIBUNE, May 1, 2016, http://www.chicagotribune.com/ 
news/plus/ct-graphics-chief-resilience-officer-hired-htmlstory.html (on file with the 
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a wide range of duties, including developing a communications 
system that can reach anyone during a storm, or a transportation 
system to get people to safety in the event of a hurricane or 
weather-related disaster.”170 These CROs will necessarily need to 
closely coordinate for DOD support and operate in a complex 
interagency-public-private partnership with FEMA, in accordance 
with city, state, corporate and NRF guidelines.171 
In a so-called mega-catastrophe, however, when the status of 
every state’s stability is uncertain, that willingness to share breaks 
down.172 In cases like these, the resources and competencies of the 
DOD will be in great need.173 In planning for such complex 
catastrophes, military leaders at all levels and federal partners 
from FEMA met on June 5, 2013 to participate in a one-day 
tabletop exercise hosted by USARNORTH to tackle different 
complex catastrophe scenarios that comprised the most serious 
crises imaginable, in a whole-of-government response to them.174 
The elaborate scenario “started with a massive earthquake 
rumbling throughout Southern California [with] cascading effects 
that followed included mudslides, broken dams, fires, flooding and 
massive property damage, not to mention the potential loss of life, 
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 170. U.S. Cities Preparing for Disasters, HOMELAND SEC. NEWS WIRE (June 13, 
2013), http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20130613-u-s-cities-preparing-
for-disasters (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and 
Social Justice). 
 171. At the time of this writing, Berkeley, California, became the next city to 
appoint a Chief Resilience Officer. See Charles Siler, I ‘Chief Resilience Officer,’ 
BERKELEYSIDE (Aug. 7, 2014, 7:00 AM), http://www.berkeleyside.com/2014/ 
08/07/berkeley-appoints-first-chief-resilience-officer/ (discussing Timothy 
Burrough’s appointment) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil 
Rights and Social Justice). A week after that appointment, Oakland, California, 
hired Victoria Salinas as its Chief Resilience Officer. See Will Doig, Oakland Hires 
Its First “Chief Resilience Officer,” Publicceo (Aug. 14, 2014), 
http://www.publicceo.com/2014/08/oakland-hires-its-first-chief-resilience-officer/ 
(noting Victoria Salinas’ appointment) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 172. See Paul Stockton, DoD and the Problem of Mega-Catastrophes, in 
THREATS AT OUR THRESHOLD HOMELAND DEFENSE AND HOMELAND SECURITY IN THE 
NEW CENTURY 21, 30 (Bert Tussing ed., 2007) (explaining that fear and disarray 
become widespread during mega catastrophes, creating a demand on the 
Department of Defense). 
 173. Id. 
 174. DeHart, supra note 12. 
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and turned a very bad situation into a worst-case 
scenario.”175Amongst the many lessons re-learned or real-world 
experiences validated, the exercise demonstrated that after state 
and local authorities had reached their capacity in dealing with 
previous disasters, additional federal authorities, such as the 
Department of Justice may have to assist local authorities with 
response to civil unrest and other challenges.176 The next such 
tabletop exercise will have taken place by June 6, 2016, Cascadia 
Rising, anticipating the required response for a magnitude 9.0 
earthquake, will take place concurrently with USNORTHCOM’s 
Ardent Sentry exercise.177 
The FBI has aptly observed that “[t]here’s no room for 
failure—when it comes to weapons of mass destruction, even a 
single incident could be catastrophic.”178 A “second nuclear age” in 
which the threat of attack by various weapons of mass destruction 
always looms large over the United States and beyond.179 “In 
accordance with direction from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, the Army provides the bulk of the Defense Chemical, 
Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response Force for Fiscal 
Year [FY] 2013 and beyond.”180 According to the National Guard 
Posture Statement, some “97% of America lives within a five-hour 
response of a National Guard Homeland Response Force or 
Chemical, Biological Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN) Enhanced 
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BLOGSPOT (July 26, 2011, 12:43 PM), http://2scottmontgomery.blogspot.com/ 
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H. Govern. Agroterrorism and Ecoterrorism: A Survey of Indo-American 
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 180. NAT’L GUARD BUR., NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVE EQUIPMENT REPORT 
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013 2–5 (2013), http://palazzo.house.gov/uploadedfiles/ngr%20 
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Response Force Package.”181 If weapons of mass destruction are 
ever used on U.S. soil, the Army Reserve’s consequence 
management capabilities, in particular, will prove indispensable 
in providing mission-ready soldiers and equipment to augment 
civilian law enforcement and other first-responder capabilities.182 
Towards that end of readiness, “[s]pecialized units like the 
National Guard’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support 
Teams conducted 1,720 response, standby, and assist missions in 
FY12.”183 
Former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta warned the nation 
in fall 2012 of a potential coming “cyber Pearl Harbor; an attack 
that would cause physical destruction and the loss of life . . . [that] 
would paralyze and shock the nation and create a new, profound 
sense of vulnerability.”184 Beyond the realms of four-dimensional 
operations on land, in and below the seas, and in the air and space, 
is a so-called “fifth domain”185 or “fifth dimension” of warfare” in 
which civilian law enforcement may have little to no capacity to 
discern cybercrime activity from cyberwarfare. 186 In an era where 
                                                                                                     
 181. NAT’L GUARD BUR., 2014 NATIONAL GUARD POSTURE STATEMENT 
SUSTAINING AN OPERATIONAL FORCE 9 (2014), http://www.nationalguard. 
mil/portals/31/Documents/PostureStatements/2014%20National%20Guard%20 
Bureau%20Posture%20Statement.pdf. 
 182. NAT’L GUARD BUR., NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVE EQUIPMENT REPORT 
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013 supra note 180, at 2–5 (“The Army provides specific 
capabilities for Federal military assistance to civilian agencies in the event of an 
attack against the United States . . . . These capabilities come from all Army 
components in support of Northern Command’s (NORTHCOM’s) mission to 
support civil authorities in the event of a disaster.”).  
 183. NAT’L GUARD BUR., 2014 NATIONAL GUARD POSTURE STATEMENT, supra 
note 181, at 27. Towards that end, “Lifesaving Capabilities” include: 10 Homeland 
Response Forces, totaling 5,660 Guard members, 17 Chemical, Biological, 
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Executives for National Security, New York City, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. (Oct. 11, 
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(on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
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http://www.economist.com/node/16478792 (on file with the Washington and Lee 
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the keyboard and mouse have become weapons of conflict as 
well as tools for peace, DOD will continue to use its significant 
capability and expertise in support of a whole-of-government 
approach to protect the Nation.187 The policy and legal 
authorities governing DOD’s domestic activities—such as 
Defense Support to Civil Authorities—extend to cyber 
operations, as they would in any other domain.188 “DOD will 
continue to work closely with its interagency partners, 
including the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security, 
to address threats to the United States from wherever they 
originate.”189 
V. Conclusion 
Past is certain to be prologue when it comes to both causes 
and effects of natural and man-made disasters. As then-
Lieutenant Colonel Michael L. Sullivan, one of Operation 
Hawkeye’s key Military Police commanders noted in the 
aftermath of disaster assistance and civil disturbance 
operations post-Hurricane Hugo, military forces have 
tremendous capabilities to “restore public order and essential 
services following a natural disaster, to train local law 
enforcement personnel to improve services, and to operate in a 
complex cultural and political setting.”190 Still, in keeping with 
the Nation’s great traditions of our military forces being 
subject to civilian control, Lt. Gen. Perry Wiggins, commanding 
general, USARNORTH has noted that: 
In 99 percent of the cases [in providing support to civil 
authorities], the DoD will be supporting another principal 
fellow agency in the response . . . and that’s important to 
understand in the difference of operating in the homeland. 
In the homeland, the strength of our nation resides in our 
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ability to respond at all levels—local, state and federal. It’s 
that synergy that creates the solution to the things in the 
homeland that challenge us in addressing our threats.191 
The day after the tragic Boston Marathon bombings, Secretary 
of Defense Chuck Hagel pledged to provide any support from 
DOD that law enforcement agencies deem necessary as they 
investigated “this cruel act of terror,”192 and Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff Martin Dempsey told Members of 
Congress that DOD officials were in “constant contact with 
state and federal agencies.”193 Consistent with this 
preparedness, the NORTHCOM Commander has testified 
before Congress that,  
The commands’ approach is to defend the homeland 
“forward” and in-depth through trusted partnerships with 
fellow combatant commands, our hemispheric neighbors, 
and the interagency community. We carry out our primary 
missions of homeland defense, security cooperation, and 
civil support with a focus on preparation, partnerships, and 
vigilance.194 
The 209-year history of the Insurrection Act, the 138-year-old 
Posse Comitatus Act, and other current and future laws, 
executive orders, defense policies, and regulations will 
continue to strictly delineate the limits to the military’s role in 
cooperating with civil authorities when future domestic 
disasters strike, and the prescriptions and proscriptions on 
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providing military equipment and training to civilian law 
enforcement, if not limits on so-called police militarization.195 
                                                                                                     
 195. For an excellent yet brief commentary on the role of the military in 
dealing with international natural and man-made disasters, see ELIZABETH 
FERRIS, AUSTRALIAN CIVIL-MILITARY CENTRE, FUTURE DIRECTIONS IN CIVIL-
MILITARY RESPONSES TO NATURAL DISASTERS 1–10 (2012), https://www. 
brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/05-civ-mil-disasters-ferris.pdf. Ferris 
notes that “[o]ver the last ten years natural disasters affected more than 2.4 
billion people—the equivalent of one-third of the earth’s population—and they 
have wrought over $910 billion in damages—equivalent to approximately 18 
percent of global GDP.” Id. at 3–6. Ferris also makes five observations regarding 
civil-military relations in international natural disaster response: 
(1) The military will increasingly be called to respond to sudden-onset 
natural disasters, both at home and abroad. 
(2) Generally there are fewer political tensions in civil-military 
relations at times of natural disaster compared with in conflict 
settings. 
(3) International actors, military or civilian, simply are not—and 
perhaps cannot be—fast enough in immediate response. 
(4) In the three phases of disaster management - prevention, response 
and recovery - the military’s role is most needed and accepted in the 
response phase and least in the recovery phase. 
(5) The military generally has more experience in preparedness 
activities hence an importance area of preparedness concerns 
developing more effective civil-military coordination mechanisms. 
Id. 
